← Founder Notes
Archive

The trust prompt on your ai coding agent is the whole security model, and attackers get code…

Yethikrishna ROriginal on Threads

the trust prompt on your ai coding agent is the whole security model, and attackers get code running before it ever appears. a booby-trapped git config line executes in several agents including claude code and codex, and one 4,176-run benchmark had agents follow malicious instructions 66.5% of the time.

the tool writing your code trusts the repo more than you do.

Context

Verified source: Manifold Security's GitSpawn disclosure (updated Sep 1, 2026) and The Hacker News (Sep 2) report eight flaws across seven command-line AI coding agents where a repo's own Git configuration names a command the agent runs on the developer's machine. The Cloud Security Alliance note (Sep 4) says that in several cases this happens before a trust prompt appears.

Manifold says Codex and Cursor were also affected, reported and patched; The Hacker News says four of the flaws were still unpatched at its writing.

How it compares

The core claim, that a booby-trapped git config can run code in several agents including before any trust prompt, matches Manifold, The Hacker News and the CSA note. The 4,176-run benchmark and its 66.5% rate were not seen in the sources read, so unsupported here, not refuted. in the excerpts read. The closest benchmark found, IssueTrojanBench on arXiv (Jul 22), tests malicious issue requests, a different attack from the git config one. 'The tool trusts the repo more than you do' is the author's opinion.

Related work

Watch next

  • Locate the benchmark behind the 4,176 runs and 66.5% and check what it measured.

Sources

  1. GitSpawn: a single flaw lets untrusted repos run code in AI coding agents, Manifold Securitymanifold.security
  2. Malicious .git configs can make Claude, Codex, Cursor and others run attacker code, The Hacker Newsthehackernews.com
  3. GitSpawn: Malicious Git Configs Hijack AI Coding Agents, Cloud Security Alliancelabs.cloudsecurityalliance.org

Provenance

The note above is reproduced unedited from the original post, first published on Threads on 30 September 2026 at 21:19 IST. Sources are the papers and datasets the note draws on.

View the original post
Embed this note
<iframe src="https://founder.myndlabs.tech/notes/embed/the-trust-prompt-on-your-ai-coding-agent-Dd6sZ68DkDu" width="480" height="420" style="border:0;max-width:100%" loading="lazy" title="The trust prompt on your ai coding agent is the whole security model, and attackers get code…"></iframe>

More notes